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QUERIES FROM QUIRIN: GUANTANAMO TRIBUNALS AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
Tanja Korpi"
INTRODUCTION
Many recent nonfiction writings contemplate recent history with one watershed
event: the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Whether in social
commentary, political discourse, or even economic calculation, the attacks have
generated debate on not only the appropriateness of the resulting Global War on
Terror ("GWOT"), but also future ramifications of any newly-set precedent. Not
surprisingly, the law and the legal profession have played prominent roles in these
debates. Recently, many legal scholars have focused their attention on the ongoing'
military commissions trying enemy combatants captured in the GWOT and held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
President George W. Bush authorized the creation of military commissions in the
"Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."' 2 In section 1(e) of this order, the
President stipulated that "individuals subject to this order.., be detained, and, when
tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals. '3 Less than two months after this declaration, the first detainees captured
in the GWOT were transferred to Guantanamo Bay.4
* The author is a J.D. candidate at the College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law. Following her graduation from the College of William & Mary in 2003 with
a bachelor's degree in government, she served as a researcher for the United States Air Force
Counterproliferation Center and was the lead author of a report in the Counterproliferation
Papers: Future Warfare Series. Tanja M. Korpi & Christopher Hemmer, Avoiding Panic and
Keeping the Ports Open in a Chemical and Biological Threat Environment: A Literature
Review (USAF Counterproliferation Ctr., Future Warfare Series No. 30, June 2005). She wishes
to thank her sister, Amanda Levoy, for graciously troubleshooting countless computer problems.
She would also like to thank the wonderful editorial board of the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal for their assistance and hard work on her behalf.
News Release, Dep't of Def., Military Comm'ns Update - November 3, 2004 (Nov.
4,2004), available at http:lwww.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/d20041lO4update.pdf (last
visited Dec. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
2 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001].
3 Id. § 1(e).
4 Gwen Robinson, Protests Over Transfer of Prisoners to Cuba, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2002, at 8.
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This Note analyzes the legal foundations of the commissions themselves and
questions whether their creation was constitutionally permissible under the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Those who argue in the affirmative contend historical
precedent and a series of United States Supreme Court decisions have crystallized
the President's ability to create the commissions.5 Conversely, those who argue in
the negative contend that the President has overstepped his bounds and that the
detainees are entitled to process in traditional U.S. courts. 6 Following a deeper consid-
eration of these differing viewpoints, this Note proposes that military commissions
are not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for three reasons: (1) the
President was acting pursuant to powers historically afforded to the Commander-in-
Chief; (2) Congress has traditionally deferred to the Commander-in-Chief in this re-
gard; and (3) the courts have crystallized the ability of the President to create military
tribunals in cases such as Ex Parte Quirin, which is applicable to the detainees in Guan-
tanamo Bay.
I. A BRIEF LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
The Global War on Terror formally began in September 2001,' but the American
government had been fighting skirmishes against terrorism for at least a decade
prior.' While it is beyond the scope of this Note to consider each of these encounters
specifically, it is important to consider the general legal methods used by the United
States to address past acts by terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda.
The United States has been legally dealing with Al Qaeda, and persons associated
with Al Qaeda, for over seventeen years.9 Initially, the government's preferred legal
' See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, What to Do With Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?:
A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591 (2002).
6 See, e.g., Martin A. Pedata, President Bush's Military Order Establishing Military
Tribunals to Try Noncitizens: Is It Beyond His Constitutional and Statutory Authority?, 76
FLA. B.J. 30 (2002).
' In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush announced, "The
deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more
than acts of terror. They were acts of war." Press Release, President George W. Bush, Remarks
by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release].
8 Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
328, 329-30 (2002).
" Osama bin Laden founded Al Qaeda in 1988. Dan Murphy & Howard LaFranchi,
Special Briefing: How Radical Islamists See the World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONrrOR, Aug. 2,
2005, at 4. For a general timeline of Al Qaeda activities, including dates of attacks on U.S.
interests abroad, see BBC News, Timeline: AI-Qaeda (Nov. 1, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/l/hi/world/3618762.stm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
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tactic against these individuals was criminal law:'" through long-arm maneuvering,
the government filed federal statute-based charges in federal district court." Indeed,
"[d]etention of an Al Qaeda member as an enemy combatant was not contemplated.
Rather, restraint on Al Qaeda's freedom of action was sought only where intelli-
gence reports could be fleshed out .... no one contemplated that we could hold him
as a combatant in an ongoing conflict .... ,2 In short, because the acts of terrorism
in the previous decade' 3 occurred outside the mantle of war, declared or undeclared,
conventional wisdom prescribed that any perpetrators should be handled by courts
in the same manner as other peacetime criminals. This paradigm of domestic judicial
intervention shifted following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.14 Within
months of this incident, President Bush, in his response to the terrorist attacks, took
many legal steps which laid the foundation for taking the legal fight against newly
captured Al Qaeda terrorists out of the haven of U.S. domestic courts and into the
battlefield where the terrorists were first captured. First, the President issued
Proclamation 7463, a "Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain
Terrorist Attacks."'" This declaration of national emergency is legally important
because it empowers the President to confiscate property of foreign interests involved
in any attack.
16
10 See Wedgwood, supra note 8, at 329-30.
I ld.
I2 ld. at 329.
" The terrorist acts against American interests here include the 1996 bombing of the
American barracks at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia (1996), the bombing of the U.S. Embassies
in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
(2000). While this is not an exhaustive list of attacks against U.S. interests abroad, these
arguably larger-scale attacks were dealt with through traditional courts. The Khobar Towers
attack resulted in fourteen men being indicted. Barbara Slavin, Officials: U.S. 'Outed' Iran's
Spies in 1997, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 2004, at A6. Of these fourteen, ten are in Saudi Arabian
custody and the remaining four are at large. Id. As of March 2004, no public trial of these
individuals had been held. Id. The embassy bombing also resulted in civilian court process.
In 2001, four Al Qaeda men received life sentences for their roles in the 1998 attacks. Phil
Hirschkom, Four Embassy Bombers Get Life, CNN.com, (Oct. 21,2001), http://archives.cnn.
con/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/index.html (last visited Jan. 31,2006) (on file with
author). Third, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole also resulted in court process. With active
U.S. legal involvement, eleven suspects were tried in Yemen for their role in the attack. Cole
Terror Suspects to Stand Trial in Yemen, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Apr. 2,2004, at 4A. Two
of these men were eventually sentenced to death. William Branigin, 2 Sentenced to Die for
USS Cole Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A18.
'4 See Wedgwood, supra note 8, at 330.
15 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001).
16 Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between
the Three Branches of Government in Coping With Past and Current Threats to the Nation's
Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 464 (2005).
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Second, the President issued the Military Order of November 13, 2001, entitled
"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism.' 17 This document is at the heart of the military commissions question." In semi-
nal part, it found that the protection of U.S. domestic, international, and military in-
terests necessitated that "individuals subject to this order... be detained, and, when
tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by mili-
tary tribunals."' 9 Third, Bush issued Executive Order 13239 of December 12, 2001,
"Designation of Afghanistan and the Airspace Above as a Combat Zone."2° The
official designation of Afghanistan is jurisdictionally critical as it is the country-of-
capture for many of the accused combatants.21 Simply put, opponents of the aforemen-
tioned Order contend that the Order is illegitimate, but even if it were legitimate, its ap-
plicability should be narrowly circumscribed to combat or operations in Afghanistan.22
Congress also took an active role in responding to the September 11, 2001, attacks.
On September 18, 2001, it passed Joint Resolution 23 authorizing the use of force
in response to the terrorist attacks.23 This resolution stated that the acts of September
11, 2001, "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its
rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad...
the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent
acts of international terrorism. '24 Joint Resolution 23 is important in light of other Con-
gressional statutes assigning power to the Commander-in-Chief, especially Article 2125
" Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2.
" Military commissions created by the Military Order are not U.S. military courts. Major
Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of
the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts, 2002 ARMY
LAW. 19, 19 (2002). "Although both courts have existed since the beginning of the United
States, they have existed for different purposes, based on different sources of constitutional
authority, and with different jurisdictional boundaries." Id. See also Major General (Ret.)
Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., Military Commissions, 2002 ARMY LAW. 1, 4 (2002).
'9 Military Order, supra note 2, § e.
20 Exec. Order No. 13,239, 66 Fed. Reg. 64,907 (Dec. 14, 2001).
21 Press Release, Dep't of Def., JTF-GTMO Information on Detainees (Mar. 4, 2005),
available athttp://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d2005O3O4info.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2006) (on file with author).
22 Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (2002).
Military commissions are linked to wartime, specifically the prosecutions of vio-
lations of the laws of war and the legal vacuum often created by the exigencies of
war .... To the extent that the United States employs military commissions to try
those directly involved in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, their use may be justi-
fied.
Id.
23 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
24 Id.
'5 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (1998).
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and Article 3626 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). President Bush
explicitly cited all three of these authorities in his Military Order.27
In March 2002, the Department of Defense released detailed procedures for the
implementation of the Order.28 While several of these procedures were different
from practices first articulated in the Order,29 the substantive standards or goals were
unaltered. Pursuant to President Bush's Order, hundreds of detainees have been
transferred to a military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Many have been released
as new prisoners arrive.3" As of this writing, there are 550 detainees currently being
held as "enemy combatants,"'" fifteen of whom have been deemed subject to com-
mission jurisdiction under the Order.32 The first of these commissions was con-
vened on August 24, 2004.33 Several of these detainees are actively pursuing habeas
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 836.
27 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2.
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836
of title 10, United States Code ....
Id.
28 Dep't of Def. Mil. Comm'n Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321 ord.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with
author).
29 Among other changes, the Bush Order required two-thirds majorities for conviction
and sentencing, including death sentences. Military order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, at
57,835, § 4(7). The DOD procedures kept the two-thirds requirement for conviction but
amended the voting requirement to be unanimity in death cases. Dep't of Def. Military
Comm'n Order No. 1, supra note 28, § 6(F); see also Louis FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON
TRIAL 168-69 (2003).
" News Release, Dep't of Def., Guantanamo Detainees (Feb. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/d20040406gua.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2005).
"' Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Rules Detainee Tribunals Illegal, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,2005,
at Al.
32 News Release, Dep't of Def., Presidential Military Order Applied to Nine More
Combatants (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.rnl/releases/2004/nr2004
0707-0987.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
"3 News Release, Dep't of Def., First Military Commission Convened at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (Aug. 24, 2004), available at http:llwww.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004
0824-1164.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Three other commissions also began that week.
United States v. Hicks began on August 25, 2005. News Release, Dep't of Def., Australian
Citizen is the Second Commissions Case (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.defense
link.mil/ releases/2004/nr20040825-1169.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). United States v.
Hamza began on August 26,2005. News Release, Dep't of Def., Third Military Commission
Interrupted by Yemeni Detainee Request (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.defense
link. mil/releases/2004/nr20040826-1174.html (last visited Jan.' 31, 2006). Lastly, United
States v. al-Qosi began on August 27, 2005. News Release, Dep't of Def., Fourth Military
Commission Concludes Week of Trials (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.defense
link.mil/releases/2004/nr20040827-1180.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
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petitions in U.S. domestic courts with mixed results. In mid-January 2005, a D.C.
judge refused to grant a habeas petition, citing a lack of viable supporting law.'
Just a few weeks later, another D.C. judge conversely held that the current military
proceedings violated due process.35
In an effort to reconcile these conflicting interpretations on commission legality,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to United States v. Hamdan on November 7,
2005.36 Arguments in this case will be heard on Tuesday, March 28, 2006.3 7 The
first of two questions presented will force the Court to analyze the validity of the
November 13, 2001, Order:
Whether the military commission established by the President to
try petitioner and others similarly situated for alleged war crimes
in the "war on terror" is duly authorized under Congress's Author-
ization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224; the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); or
the inherent powers of the President?
3 8
Despite the Court's grant of certiorari in Hamdan, the government remains resolute
in its belief in the commission's legality. In fact, on the very day certiorari was
awarded, the government instituted commissions against five other eligible detainees.3 9
Of the fifteen detainees subject to commission under the Order, ten are now in active
process.'0
4 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[N]o viable legal theory
exists by which [the Court] could issue a writ of habeas corpus under these circumstances.").
31 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[T]he
procedures implemented by the government to confirm that the petitioners are enemy com-
batants subject to indefinite detention violate the petitioners' rights to due process of law.").
36 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005). Newly appointed Chief Justice John Roberts
will not take part in the Hamdan decision because he has previously voted in favor of the com-
missions while on the federal appeals bench. Caroline Daniel & Patti Waldmeir, Miers
Expected to Be President's Terror Ally: Bush's Court Nominee Is More Likely to Make Her
Mark on the War on Terror than on Abortion, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at 7.
31 Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar (October Term 2005), Session
Beginning March 20, 2006, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralargumentsl
argument calendars/monthlyargumentcalmarch2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
38 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (No. 05-184), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00184qp.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
" Kathleen T. Rhem, Judge Orders Military Trial at Guantanamo Bay Halted, Am. Forces
Info Serv., Nov. 15,2005, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/20051115-
3356.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
40 Dep't of Def., Military Commissions: Charge Sheets, available at http://www.defense
link.mil/news/Nov2004/chargesheets.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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H. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS
The designation of the President as Commander-in-Chief stems from the Con-
stitution. 41 "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States .... ,42 The precise function this military role plays
within the general power of the President has been the subject of much controversy.
The Framers, for their part, provided little concrete clarification in the matter.
According to some analysts, the Framers intended limits on the executive's power at
all times: "[The Framers] were opposed to governments that placed in the hands of
one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws. 4 3 Other analysts suggest
the Framers intended both a peacetime and a"'fighting Constitution. '"' Justice Burton
articulated this latter view in his dissent in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,45 a case regarding
the use of military tribunals in the governance of Hawaii while that territory was under
emergency martial law following the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Justice Burton wrote:
[The Constitution] was written by a generation fresh from war.
The people established a more perfect union, in part, so that they
might the better defend themselves from military attack. In doing
so they centralized far more military power and responsibility in
the Chief Executive than previously had been done. The Constitu-
tion was built for rough as well as smooth roads. In time of war
the nation simply changes gears and takes the harder going under
the same power.'
41 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
42 id.
" Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946).
44 ERNEST R. MAY, THE ULTIMATE DECISION: THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF
4 (1960) (emphasis in original) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the
Constitution, 42 A.B.A. REP. 232, 248 (1917)). Several scholars have expanded on this idea
of a 'fighting Constitution" by elaborating various presidential policy goals served by the
creation of military commissions in times of conflict. The first, and perhaps important, goal
of any President following domestic attack is to safeguard the nation against subsequent
attack. In accomplishing this goal, a President may be forced to take actions that affect the
processing of not only U.S. nationals, but also foreign nationals. In short, for the sake of
protecting national security, the President may adopt protective and victory-oriented goals
in certain wartime contexts. This is a shift from the deterrent and rehabilitative goals of court
processes in peacetime. In the words of Professor Laurence Tribe, "Civil liberties is not only
about protecting us from our government. It is also about protecting our lives from terrorism."
George Will, Military Tribunals Are the Only Solution, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2001, at 35
(quoting Laurence Tribe).
" Duncan, 327 U.S. at 342 (Burton, J., dissenting).
46 Id.
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While neither the "non-fighting" nor "fighting" Constitution viewpoints has been
formally adopted, certain tenets eventually emerged that guide the President's powers
in times of formally declared war.47 Unfortunately, the reality of modem conflict is that
wars often go undeclared,48 leaving the President and Congress to coordinate military
affairs and foreign policy in ways that could seem improvised to an observing Framer.
The proper scope of presidential power in times "'short of war,""9 or times other-
wise lacking explicit Congressional mandate to act, is undefined. Courts have consis-
tently found that the propriety of a given presidential activity should be tested only
within its context.5 0 This sentiment was most succinctly elaborated in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, where the Court found that the President's seizure of steel mills on
the eve of a strike constituted an improper use of his executive power.5 ' Justice
Jackson wrote, "[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
'5 2
While this mandate offers little in the way of direction, courts have consistently up-
held presidential authority in a number of areas, including the establishment of mili-
tary commissions.3
41 First, if the United States is the victim of attack, the role of the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, is that of defense. The President may mobilize the military to protect domestic
interest from foreign assaults. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A
CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 10 (1974). Second, in times of war, the President
is tasked with directing military activities. While Congress is charged with formally declaring
war, the President is charged with carrying out the war. Id. Third, the President is constrained to
keep the war's conduct within the scope of Congressional authorization. The President may not
change the scope of the conflict. Id.
48 While the last officially declared war was World War II, the U.S. has engaged militarily
in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, and the Middle East.
49 DOROTHY SCHAFFTER & DOROTHY M. MATHEWS, THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES, at VIII (Da Capo
Press photo. reprint 1974) (1956).
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
SI Id. at 579 (majority opinion).
52 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring), cited in Juan R. Tortuella, On the Slippery Slopes
of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 648, 659 (2002).
" In 1946, for instance, the Supreme Court expressly labeled the Presidential power to
create commissions as a "war power." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946). Justice Stone
wrote:
The warpower, from which the commission derives its existence, is not limited
to victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways Congress has
recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced.
Id. Later scholars further added that
[the Supreme Court in ex Parte Quirin] emphasized that military commissions
predated the Constitution. The Quirin Court held that the Framers did not intend
to change the pre-Constitution common law rules of military commissions....
1636 [Vol. 14:1629
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Additionally, the presidential power to establish military commissions is arguably
codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice vis-A-vis the United States Code.'
Article 21 of the UCMJ states that the jurisdiction of courts-martial is not exclusive,
i.e., "this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do[es] not deprive mil-
itary commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent juris-
diction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may
be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals."" Article
36 of the UCMJ additionally states that "[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures...
for cases arising under this chapter triable in... military commissions... may be pre-
scribed by the President." 6 Together, these articles are seen by many as a general Con-
gressional authorization of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to create military
commissions.57
The use of military commissions to try domestic threats has been upheld since
the early days of the Revolutionary 58 and Civil59 Wars. However, one of the first
[T]herefore, it follows that the Constitution did not prevent the pre-Constitution
common law authority of military commanders to establish military commissions
when they thought necessary.
Anne English French, Note, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military Commissions
Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1250-51 (2002) (footnote omitted).
" R. Peter Masterton, Military Commissions and the War on Terrorism, 36 INT'L LAW.
1165, 1166 n.13 (2002).
The UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (the "UCMJ") is contained in 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-946(2000). The UCMJ provides that the President may prescribe
rules for trials by military commissions. 10 U.S.C. § 836. Articles 106 and 104
of the UCMJ specifically mention the use of military commissions in the trial of
spies and persons who aid the enemy. 10 U.S.C. §§ 906, 904. The preamble to
the Manual for Courts-Martial also mentions military commissions as an
authorized exercise of military jurisdiction.
Id.
5 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (1998). Admittedly, "Article 21 does not expressly give the Presi-
dent authority to establish a military commission, but merely states that statutes and the law
of war define the permissible jurisdiction of military commissions." French, supra note 53,
at 1255 n.135.
56 10 U.S.C.A. § 836 (1998).
" See, e.g., Col. Frederic L. Borch III, Why Military Commissions Are the Proper Forum
and Why Terrorists Will Have "Full and Fair" Trials: A Rebuttal to Military Commissions:
Trying American Justice, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 10, 1 ln.12.
58 Christopher M. Evans, Note, Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional
Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51
DUKE L.J. 1831, 1836-37 (2002) (footnotes omitted) ("Throughout the Revolutionary War,
a number of enemy spies were tried and convicted before military commissions. George
Washington personally ordered the executions of several of those convicted.").
" During the early years of the Civil War, General Henry Halleck, a Commander of
Union forces, faced resistance from Southern sympathizers near his bases in Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio. Major Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, ARMY
LAW., Mar. 2002, at 41,43. In response, he issued a military order subjecting those unlawful
2006] 1637
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instances of their use to deal with foreign threats was seen in Ex Parte Quirin.6° In
Quirin, eight German saboteurs were caught infiltrating the United States. 6' In re-
sponse, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2561, "Denying Certain
Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States,"62 and the Military Order of July
2, 1942, "Appointment of a Military Commission. 63 The combination of these
documents effectively pronounced that the saboteurs' legal process would take place
by way of military tribunals.' While the saboteurs appealed that they were entitled
to U.S. civil court access, the Supreme Court held they were not constitutionally en-
titled to civil trials. 65 In an 8-0 decision (Justice Murphy took no part in the case66),
Justice Stone affirmed the use of military commissions because the President had
been acting under his constitutionally vested authority to establish the commissions
and designate the defendants as "unlawful belligerents. ' 67 The Quirin decision crys-
tallized the President's power to create military tribunals with effective jurisdiction
over foreign unlawful belligerents.
combatants to process by military commission. Id. Several convictions through these commis-
sions resulted in appeal to the Supreme Court, including one undertaken by Lambdin Milligan.
Id. at 43-44. Milligan's conviction was ultimately overturned in the seminal Exparte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), where the Court articulated: "Martial rule can never exist where
the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of theirjurisdiction." Id. at 127.
60 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
61 id.
62 JENNIFER ELSEA, TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR
CRIMINALS BEFOREMILITARY COMMISSIONS, at CRS-46 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report
for Cong., Order Code RL31191, Dec. 11,2001), available athttp://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/7951 .pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
63 Id. at CRS-47.
64 The operative wording of Roosevelt's Proclamation 2561 reads: "By virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, do hereby
proclaim that all persons [subject to this proclamation] ... shall be subject to the law of war
and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals ..... Proclamation 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July
2, 1942) [hereinafter Roosevelt's Proclamation 2561]. Roosevelt's Military Order, in
pertinent part, reads: "By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander
in Chief [I establish a military commission which] ... shall have power to and shall, as
occasion requires, make such rules for the conduct of the proceeding .... Appointment of
a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942) [hereinafter Roosevelt's Military
Order].
61 Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
6 Justice Murphy voluntarily removed himself from the case because he was on active
military reserve duty. Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning
andImplications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 78 (1980). Murphy felt that
having a member of the military involved in deciding the propriety of a Military Order could
subject the Court to a "breath of criticism." Letter from Frank Murphy to Ed Kemp (Sept.
10, 1942), quoted in Belknap, supra, at 78.
67 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35.
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The standard outlined in Quirin has been expanded upon in subsequent court
cases. By 1952, in Madsen v. Kinsella,68 the Supreme Court had outlined that mili-
tary tribunals were appropriate venues to try civilians who had violated the law in
three areas: those who violate the traditional laws of war,69 those who violate the
non-traditional laws of war,7° and those who commit crimes in occupied territories.7
While the facts of Madsen 2 are dissimilar from those of the Guantanamo detainees,
Justice Burton's discussion of tribunal jurisdiction is still applicable today.7 3
While the common law evolution of the presidential power to create military
tribunals is persuasive on its own, it is not the only source of the President's authority
in this area. Statute, too, has provided the foundation for the recently established tribu-
nal system. As mentioned, Joint Resolution 23, coupled with Articles 21 and 36 of the
UCMJ, add Congressionally-provided weight to the President's common law power.74
This point is key, given the common criticism of several Order opponents, who con-
tend that
in the absence of an emergency that threatens truly irreparable
damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution's text,
structure, and logic demand approval by Congress .... Congress
at a minimum must clearly provide by law for the trial of such
["unlawful"] combatants by military commissions; it can do so
either through a formal declaration of war or by specific author-
izing legislation.75
However, these critics overlook a number of salient facts that suggest the very criter-
ion they outline has been satisfied: while the United States is without afornal decla-
ration of war, such a fact is not sufficient to conclude that partial-war conditions do
68 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
69 See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
70 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
7' See Madsen, 343 U.S. 341.
72 Madsen involved a wife charged for the murder of her Army-serviceman husband
while both were living in the U.S. Area of Control, Germany. Id. at 343. The wife, a U.S. citi-
zen, had been tried and convicted by a military court. Id. In deciding the tribunal properly
had jurisdiction over the wife, the Court held that "[iun the absence of attempts by Congress
to limit the President's power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief... [the President] may,
in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions."
Id. at 348.
" Madsen has not been overruled. In fact, it is cited in the dissenting opinion in the very
recent Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 588 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Bush's Military Order cites Articles 21 and 36. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra
note 2.
" Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1266 (2002) (emphasis in original).
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not exist. As such, after historical analysis of similar situations with similar statu-
tory underpinnings, it can be argued that Joint Resolution 23 (with UCMJ Articles
21 and 36) does suffice as specific authorizing legislation.
While the United States has not formally declared war since 1941, it has never-
theless often engaged abroad militarily, including the Vietnam War and the first
Persian Gulf War.76 Indeed, like the undeclared Vietnam and Gulf wars, the current
undeclared GWOT, which began following the catastrophic events of September
11 th and Joint Resolution 23, should be viewed as equally potent Congressional
mandates for Commander-in-Chief action. Joint Resolution 23
seems to be as robust as a declaration of war would be. It author-
izes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force"
and specifically invokes the War Powers Resolution .... [T]he
intent of Congress to recognize a state of war seems impossible
to avoid when one considers other contemporary legislation.77
In sum, the President's authority to create military tribunals stems from both a com-
mon law understanding of the power of the Commander-in-Chief and statutory man-
date. While the system of checks and balances and separation of powers remains essen-
tial for an effective government, the creation of military tribunals remains a respected
tool by which the President may achieve national security ends in times of conflict.
Ill. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS
"[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court; '78 and "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations. ... ,,79 The power derived from these
two Constitutional provisions is tantamount to a Congressional power of enabling
authority: the separation of powers doctrine requires that most Presidential action taken
under the mantle of Commander-in-Chief occur only following Congressional appro-
val.8° In short, "the Constitution specifies that Congress must first vest the executive
76 Military engagement in Vietnam was authorized by House Joint Resolution 1145. H.R.J.
Res. 1145, 88th Cong. (1964). Military engagement in the Persian Gulf War was authorized
by House Joint Resolution 77. H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong. (1991).
" John M. Bickers, Military Commissions Are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to
Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEx. TECH. L. REV 899, 917 (2003).
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
80 There is only a narrow set of circumstances where the President may act without Con-
gressional approval or in the face of Congressional disapproval. "In the latter category, the Presi-
dent can veto bills, make recess appointments, remove purely executive officials at will, receive
ambassadors, convene Congress 'on extraordinary Occasions,' and adjourn Congress when
there is internal disagreement about when to adjourn." Katyal & Tribe, supra note 75, at 1267.
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with additional authority, just as it must first vest jurisdiction in the judicial branch
or in other 'Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court' to hear certain categories of
cases." 81 Without a doubt, Joint Resolution 23 (against the backdrop of Articles 21
and 36 of the UCMJ) provides for some Congressional enabling of Commander-in-
Chief action. 82 However, proponents and opponents of the Order diverge in an-
swering whether these statutes provided sufficient enabling authority to convene mili-
tary tribunals in the instant case.8 ' Analysis of historical events, coupled with the Bush
administration's documented clarification of the tribunals' purpose and scope, sug-
gests the Joint Resolution and UCMJ Articles, first, suffice as enabling authority with-
in the contemporary meaning of the statutes84 and, second, suffice as current enabling
authority given what sufficed as enabling authority in the past.85 Third, even if the
Joint Resolution is deemed to add nothing, i.e., that Congress has been silent in the
issue, the President still did not tread upon the toes of Congress in his actions.86
First, President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, does not violate
separation of powers because it was specifically enabled by citing Joint Resolution
81 Id. at 1268 (footnote omitted).
82 For illustrative purposes, the Joint Resolution, as its short title clearly suggests, affords
the President the ability to dispatch troops. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
83 For instance, Kathleen Clark, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis,
Missouri, contends that while these authorities allow for military commissions generally,
they do not allow for the specific commissions created by the President in his November 13th
Military Order. Kathleen Clark, President Bush's Order on Military Trials of Non-Citizens:
Beyond His Constitutional or Statutory Authority, http://www.cnss.org/ClarkMemo.Final.doc
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
" As William P. Barr, former U.S. Attorney General, and Andrew G. McBride, former
assistant to the Attorney General, write, 'The President's decision to provide for military
tribunals is well grounded in constitutional law, historical precedent and common sense."
William P. Barr & Andrew G. McBride, Military Justicefor al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2001, at B7.
85 While there are differences, President Roosevelt's Order and President Bush's Order
also bear striking similarities. See FISHER, supra note 29, at 159-60. The constitutionality
of Roosevelt's Order was upheld in Quirin. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). In fact,
Justice Jackson, in agreeing with Justice Stone's majority opinion, wrote, "I think... we are
exceeding our powers in reviewing the legality of the President's Order and that experience
shows the judicial system unfitted to deal with matters in which we must present a united
front to a foreign foe." Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson (Oct. 22, 1942), quoted in
Belknap, supra note 66, at 79. In parallel, the Bush administration contends Quirin should
prove persuasive precedent over the detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven
Lee Myers, Presidential Order: Senior Administration Officials Defend Military Tribunals for
Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6.
86 W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO
HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 191-92 (1981) ("So long as the legislators do not
explicitly condition or reject policy adopted by the Executive and so long as he can lawfully
obtain the necessary implementing tools, he ought to control the operation from initiation
through conduct to termination.").
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23 and the accompanying UCMJ provisions.87 Joint Resolution 23 allows the President
"to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations.., he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.., in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism. ''88 Here, the military tribunals were insti-
tuted for the sake of preventing future harm. The tribunal's purpose is not correction,
but rather protection. 9
Indeed, Joint Resolution 23 does not explicitly sanction - or even mention -
military tribunals. Critics contend that "[i]t authorizes the President to activate the
reserves and send troops to Afghanistan, but says nothing about the methods to be
used to try those who are captured and accused of participating in the attacks."9 How-
ever, a lack of language should not automatically eliminate the Resolution as an ena-
bling authority. Congress has traditionally deferred to the President in foreign affairs
and given him a broad swath of power in this area.9' In fact, the Supreme Court has
upheld "plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations - a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress. '92 This fact should be particularly per-
suasive given the comments of senior members of Congress following the adoption
of Joint Resolution 23. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., former chairman of both the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee, remarked:
[W]e authorize you, in the name of the American people, to take
action, and we define the action in generic terms which you can
take. We gave the President today, as we should have and as is
our responsibility, all the authority he needs to prosecute these
individuals or countries, without yielding our Constitutional right
to retain the judgment in the future as to whether or not force
could, should, or would be used.
87 The Military Order explicitly cited these as enabling authority: "By the authority vested
in me as President and as Commander in Chief ... and the laws of the United States of
America, including [Joint Resolution 23] and [Articles 21 and 36 of the UCMJ]." Military
Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, at 57, 833.
S8 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
89 Barr & McBride, supra note 84 ("Our body politic is not attempting to discipline an
errant member; it is protecting itself from an external threat to its own collective safety.").
90 BARBARA OLSHANSKY, SECRET TRIALS AND ExECUTIONS: MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 38 (2002).
91 Greg Neugebauer, Military Tibunals and the War on Terrorism: Does Congress
Matter?, 35 DuQ. SCH. L. NEWS MAG., No. 2 (Spring 2002), available at http://www.juris.
duq.edu/spring2002/pdf/military.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
92 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), cited in
Neugebauer, supra note 91.
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... [H]e has our commitment under the Constitution now to
support him in what action he takes as defined by the authority he
has. 9
3
Finally, critics contend in this juncture that Joint Resolution 23 is not sufficient en-
abling authority to act because this is not a time of formally declared war.94 However,
it can be persuasively argued that Joint Resolution 23 itself is practically equivalent
to a declaration of war.95 As such, Bush's Order establishing tribunals can be cate-
gorized as "war power" - as the Court noted in Yamashita: "The war power, from
which the [military] commission derives its existence, is not limited to victories in
the field .... 96
Second, President Bush' s Military Order does not violate the separation of powers
doctrine because its enabling provisions parallel, in seminal part, the enabling pro-
visions in Roosevelt's 1941 Order. In Quirin, the Supreme Court found Roosevelt's
Order to be constitutional. 97 In analyzing this contention further, it is useful to con-
sider the two salient areas where Roosevelt's Order and Bush's Order are directly
parallel. Along these lines, it is also useful to consider where the Roosevelt and Bush
Orders diverge and to analyze the importance - if any - of the differences.
The Orders parallel one another procedurally. 98 Both required the same voting
proportions for conviction and sentencing" and prescribed the same "probative value
to a reasonable" person '°° standard for evidence admittance. Both also required a
" Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Statement on Senate Joint Resolution 23 Authorizing the
President to Use Force to Respond to September 11 th Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 14, 2001),
available at http://biden.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=229863&& (last visited Jan.
29, 2006).
9 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
9' Bickers, supra note 77, at 917.
Yet the Joint Resolution seems to be as robust as a declaration of war would be.
It authorizes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" and
specifically invokes the War Powers Resolution in so doing. Indeed, the intent of
Congress to recognize a state of war seems impossible to avoid when one considers
other contemporary legislation.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Evans, supra note 58, at 1851 (noting that Bush has "the con-
stitutional power under Quirin to establish military commissions to punish offenses against
the law of war, even without an official declaration by Congress").
96 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
97 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
98 FISHER, supra note 29, at 159.
99 Two-thirds for each, though the Department of Defense vis-A-vis the Bush Order later
added a unanimity requirement for death cases. Compare Roosevelt's Military Order, supra
note 64, with Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § 4(c)(7), amended by Dep't of
Def. Mil. Comm'n Order No. 1, supra note 28, § 6(F).
'0 Compare Roosevelt's Military Order, supra note 64, with Military Order of Nov. 13,
2001, supra note 2, § 4(c)(3).
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"full and fair" trial process' °' and prohibited judicial review.'0 2 Additionally, the
Orders parallel one another in substantive purpose. Under the Roosevelt Order,
which was meant to protect
the safety of the United States[,] ... all persons who are subjects,
citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States...
[and who] enter or attempt to enter the United States or any ter-
ritory or possession thereof... [and who are] charged with...
violations of the law of war0 3
shall be subject to military tribunals. In parallel, the purpose of the Bush Order was
to
protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective con-
duct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks ....
[All persons subject to this order shall] be detained, and, when
tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applic-
able laws by military tribunals."°4
For these reasons, the Bush Order of 2001 should be recognized as being as legally
potent as the Roosevelt Order in 1942.
While the Roosevelt and Bush Orders are parallel in many procedural and sub-
stantive aspects, there are a number of marked differences which fuel the fires of
critics' contentions that the 2001 Order is illegitimate.0 5 Perhaps one of the most
salient differences is the scope:'06 where the Roosevelt Order was backward-looking
at the eight saboteurs at issue, the Bush Order is forward-looking at whomever the
President "from time to time in writing"'0 7 deems a threat. However, while this
difference may be marked, it is not enough to detract from a Roosevelt Order-Bush
Order parallel for three reasons. First, the nature of contemporary threats is salient
enough to suggest that a more open-ended scope should be articulated. As President
Bush articulated in the weeks following the terrorist attacks, the United States is
"01 Compare Roosevelt's Military Order, supra note 64, with Military Order of Nov. 13,
2001, supra note 2, §4(c)(2).
102 Compare Roosevelt's Proclamation 2561, supra note 64, with Military Order of Nov.
13, 2001, supra note 2, § 7(b)(2).
103 Roosevelt's Proclamation 2561, supra note 64.
'04 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § l(e).
0' Some critics contend that the broad purview of the Order makes "the risk that the
Military Order will ensnare innocent people seeking to help relief efforts in other nations
seem[] very high indeed." OLSHANSKY, supra note 90, at 17.
106 FISHER, supra note 29, at 158-59.
107 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § 2(a).
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facing a new kind of enemy: a nebulous non-nation-state.l°S Second, while Roosevelt
and Bush made different decisions as to the appropriate scope of their Orders, both
were nonetheless based on principles of political decision. In other words, the impor-
tant factor is not the determination of physical scope, but rather the power to have
made the scope determination in thefirstplace °9 Third, the broad scope of Bush's
Order in no way implies an imminent slippery slope of "dictatorial power" as some
critics contend. "0 Aside from the fact that critics do not present any empirical evidence
of this executive power running amok,"' it is also unlikely - in the abstract - that
the President would allow the broad nature of the Order to snowball into extremism. "12
Third, President Bush's Military Order does not violate separation of powers
because, even if Joint Resolution 23 and UCMJ provisions are considered silent on
the matter of tribunals, the President still behaved vis-A-vis his common law power
as Commander in Chief."3 In the words of one scholar: "[In the face of] congressional
108 Press Release, supra note 7.
" "[T]he determination that someone is an enemy of the United States, and therefore
subject to [military commissions] for trying their alleged criminality - is a political, not a
judicial, decision.... Political authorities determine the identity of our nation's enemies."
Anderson, supra note 5, at 634 (emphasis in original). Indeed, Congress may be said to make
political decisions as well. However, "it is for [the President] to judge at the outset where
defense ends and aggression begins, subject to later review by Congress and the public."
REVELEY, supra note 86, at 192-93. As of the time of this writing, there are no pending bills
which either attempt to limit the definition section of the Order or otherwise to redefine who
is subject to tribunals.
" William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31 ("Mis-
advised by a frustrated and panic-stricken attorney general, a president of the United States
has just assumed what amounts to dictatorial power to jail or execute aliens."). Other critics
take the slippery slope argument further by contending Bush's Order provides license for the
GWOT to continue until all groups associated with terrorism - including the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo, Irish IRA, and Peruvian Shining Path - "are eradicated." Fitzpatrick, supra note
22, at 347.
"'. A survey of secondary sources offered no empirical instances of the Military Order
being used to secure any individual who was not found in combat zones under suspicious
circumstances or suspected of having direct ties to Al Qaeda operations.
112 In fact, the Bush administration does offer empirical evidence that a snowball effect
is unlikely. In December 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reminded the nation: In
Germany, during and following WWII, the United States "prosecuted 1,672 individuals for
war crimes before U.S. military commissions. Convictions were obtained in 1,416 cases. In
Japan, we tried 996 suspected war criminals before military commissions - of which 856
were convicted. These conviction rates ... are lower than the felony conviction rate in the
U.S. federal courts [in 2000]." Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Defense, Prepared State-
ment: Senate Armed Services Committee "Military Commissions" (Dec. 12,2001), available
at http://www.defenselink.miil/speeches/2001/s20011212-depsecdef2.html (last visited Jan.
25, 2006) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Statement].
"i' While the President may also be enabled by statute, he has a "[c]ommon law authority
for the military commission [which] is derived from the law of war." A. Wigfall Green, The
Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 834 (1948).
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silence, the President should be constitutionally free to act, limited only by (1) the
necessity to inform the legislators fully of developments on a continuing basis, (2)
defensive purpose, and (3) the availability of implementing tools."" 4 Given the
President's general common law power to create military commissions, as discussed
in the first section of this Note, these three factors should be analyzed in determining
whether President Bush has stayed within constitutional limits in the face of what
critics contend is congressional silence.
First, President Bush has sufficiently informed Congress. Some critics present
evidence that Congress was not sufficiently apprised of the prospect of military
tribunals vis-A-vis an apparent lack of tribunal discussions at Joint Resolution 23
debates." 5 However, pursuant to his obligations under Joint Resolution 23, Bush
has offered numerous reports to Congress informing them of progress in the GWOT." 1
6
Second, President Bush has a sufficiently defensive purpose. The Military Order
makes no mention of offensive, aggressive purposes, rather only the goal "[t]o protect
the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations
and prevention of terrorist attacks.""' 7 In the immediate weeks following the Military
Order's promulgation, Alberto Gonzales, then-White House General Counsel and
current Attorney General, remarked, "Obviously, those who were responsible for the
acts of September 11 should be caught and they need to be punished. But equally
important, is to do everything that we can to insure that there are no future attacks on
Americans here or overseas.""' In turn, the Supreme Court has also consistently
validated the permissibility of tribunals in executive action meant to protect the na-
tion.ll
9
Third, Bush has sufficient constitutional implementing tools to create the Order.
Several critics highlight that the Court in Quirin "expressly left open the question
whether the President's commander-in-chief power alone is authority to establish a
military commission, since Article of War 15 recognized such authority.' 120 However,
114 REVELEY, supra note 86, at 191.
"' Pedata, supra note 6, at n.8.
116 President Bush reported progress in the GWOT in the form of letters to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. These report
letters were delivered on September 24,2001, October 9,2001, March 20,2002, September
20, 2002, and March 21, 2003. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Mar. 20,2003), available athttp://usinfo.org/wf-archive/
2003/030321/epf517.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
117 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § 1(e).
118 Interview by Jim Lehrer with Alberto Gonzales, White House General Counsel, on The
MacNeil/LehrerNewsHour (PBS television broadcast Nov.28, 2001), available at http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/white-house/july-decOl/gonzales-I 1-28.html (last visited Jan. 25,2006).
"' Lacey, supra note 59, at 47. ("On several petitions for review, the Supreme Court has
upheld the legitimacy of such tribunals.").
20 Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Terrorism & the Law, Report and Recommendations on
Military Commissions 3 (Jan. 4,2002), available athttp://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.
pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter ABA Report].
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the question of whether Quirin, alone, is "sufficient" precedential foundation for
Bush's Military Order has an answer in the affirmative. First, the use of Quirin-
style military commissions may be deemed "codified" within the UCMJ.12 ' Spe-
cifically, Congress passed UCMJ Article 21 in 1950, six years after the decision in
Quirin: "The legislative history to this reenacted [UCMJ] provision suggests that
Congress was aware of, and accepted, Quirin's interpretation of the provision. 122
In conclusion here, a survey of historical events and contemporary statements
by the administration suggests first that Joint Resolution 23 (and its accompanying
UCMJ provisions) suffices as enabling authority within the contemporary meaning
of the statutes. Second, these authorities suffice as current enabling authority given
what has been deemed adequate enabling authority in the past. Third, even if the
Joint Resolution is deemed to add zero authorization, in that Congress has been silent
on the issue, the President did not overstep his executive powers in enacting the Order.
IV. CLARIFICATION BY THE COURTS
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. ' 123 The Court, in numerous cases, has expounded on the separation of po-
wers doctrine generally and Presidential powers specifically. It has decided that, when
the President and Congress are in apparent conflict, it shall be the role of courts to deter-
mine the proper division of power. 124 The realm of military actions is no exception."
121 UCMJ Articles 21 and 36 are the second and third cited sources for authority under the
Military Order. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2. Article 21 reads:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial
do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or
by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994). Article 21 was intended to "retain the common law jurisdiction of
military commissions." ABA Report, supra note 120, at 2 n. 1. Article 36 states that "[p]retrial,
trial, and post-trial procedures.., for cases arising under this chapter triable in... military
commissions... may be prescribed by the President." 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1994).
122 Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 261, 275 (2002).
123 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
124 See, e.g., id. at 167 (holding that "[t]he question [of] whether a right has vested or not,
is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority.").
125 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).('The Constitution thus invests the President,
as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to
carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war .... "). Chief Justice
Chase's dissent in Ex parte Milligan further articulated that "Congress has.., the power to
provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential
to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the [Presi-
dent's] command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the more pertinent case in discussing the constitutionality of Bush's
Order is Ex parte Quirin, a 1942 case detailing the fate of eight Nazi saboteurs who
entered the United States during World War H for the purposes of espionage and
inflicting damage to key U.S. infrastructure. 26 Roosevelt ordered, through the Military
Order of 1942, that these individuals were subject to process by military tribunal. 127
The individuals appealed this Order and sought habeas relief in U.S. federal courts. 28
This relief was denied; Justice Stone articulated: "[Roosevelt's Order detaining and
trying the petitioners is] not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction
that [it is] in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally
enacted."' 29 Likewise, "[Roosevelt's Order] convening the Commission was a lawful
order and.., the Commission was lawfully constituted .... .""0 All eight saboteurs
were ultimately tried by these tribunals.'
13
The facts in Quirin parallel the pertinent facts in the September 11 th attacks.
First, both "were terrorist attacks motivated to coerce and intimidate the United States
to obtain a political benefit."'' 32 In Quirin, the goal of the saboteurs' "Operation
Pastorius" was to inflict major damage on U.S. interests and philosophies 133 through
espionage and sabotage.' 34 In taking "credit" for the September 11 th attacks, Osama
bin Laden expressed that his (and al Qaeda' s) goals had also been to do damage to
U.S. interests and philosophies, 135 but this time through destruction and murder. 1
36
126 Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
127 Id. at 18-19.
128 Id. at 20.
129 Id. at 48.
130 Id. at 25.
13' All eight saboteurs were found guilty and sentenced to death on August 1, 1942.2 Nazi
Saboteurs Freed by Truman, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1948, at 9. Within one week of this sen-
tence, six of these eight had been executed by electric chair. Steve Wick, The Nazi Invasion of
LI, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1998, at A17. The remaining two had their sentences commuted for
aiding the administration in the capture of the others. Id. John George Dasch received thirty
years; Ernest Peter Burger received life. Id. Both, however, were ultimately released and flown
back to Germany nearly six years later. Id. In the ensuing years, Dasch complained of poor
treatment in Germany, "where he was perceived as a traitor. He wanted to return to the United
States." Wick, supra.
132 Keith S. Alexander, Note, In the Wake of September 1lth: The Use of Military Tribunals
to Try Terrorists, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 885, 896 (2003).
"' FISHER, supra note 29, at 6. Another goal of the Nazi saboteurs was to promote the
"Master Race" ideals of Nazi fascism. Id.
134 Id.
131 Osama bin Laden, as is commonly noted, promotes an extremist version of Islam. He
has articulated, "Those youth who conducted the [September 11th] operations did not accept
any fiqh in the popular terms, but they accepted the fiqh that the prophet Muhammad brought."
CNN.com, Transcript of Osama Bin Laden Videotape, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://
archives.cnn.com/2001fUS/12/13/tape.transcript (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
136 Id. ("[Wihen people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the
strong horse. This is only one goal .... [W]e calculated in advance the number of casualties ....
We calculated [] the floors that would be hit .... I was the most optimistic of them all.").
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Second, both attacks were not actions by rogue individuals, but rather by a con-
trolled military organization. 37 Third, both attacks involved direct assault on the
U.S. mainland. This is significant given that "the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
possesses emergency authority to use military force to defend the nation from attack
without obtaining prior congressional approval."1 38
Given the similarities between September 1 1th and the Quirin facts, the Bush
Administration formally relied on Quirin as precedent in justifying the November
13th Order creating military tribunals.'39 In November 2001, less than two weeks
after Bush's Military Order creating the tribunals, then-Assistant Attorney General
Michael Chertoff told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the terms of the Bush
Military Order were "virtually identical"' to the terms of Roosevelt's 1942 Proc-
lamation. For Bush officials - and the Court14 ' - Quirin continues to remain per-
suasive precedent in the case of military tribunals. 1
42
At this juncture, critics often contend that Quirin should not be controlling
precedent because the context of that case is factually dissimilar from Bush's 2001
establishment of tribunals.143 These critics attempt to distinguish the Quirin tribunals
from the Bush tribunals on three main levels: current lack of declared war,'" current
lack of targeted enemy state or entity, 145 and the current need to consider international
norms and laws.' 46 Indeed, while these criticisms are valid, they should not be per-
suasive. The discussion below will contend that despite factual differences, the Quirin
137 See, e.g., Thomas Geraghty, Comment, The Criminal-Enemy Distinction: Prosecuting
a Limited War Against Terrorism Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 33
MCGEORGE L. REv. 551, 588 (2002).
138 Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
139 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hear-
ings Before the S. on the Comm. Judiciary, 107th Cong. 51 (2001) (statement of Michael
Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=126&witid=66 (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
'" Id. ("I believe the [Roosevelt] proclamation, in many respects, is virtually identical to
this. [The Bush Order] obviously is broader in the sense that it is not directed just at a single
group of saboteurs, but it is directed more generally at a potentially larger class of people.").
' Quirin has not been overruled.
142 Rumsfeld Statement, supra note 112.
Military commissions have been used in times of war since the Founding of this
nation. George Washington used them during the Revolutionary War; They [sic]
were used during the Civil War; President Franklin Roosevelt used them during
World War II.
Indeed in that [latter] case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
military commissions.
Id.
14 Evans, supra note 58, at 1844.
'44 Id. at 1844-45.
145 id.
'46 Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military Commissions, Terrorism, and Domestic Case Precedent,
76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1401 (2003).
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and Bush scenarios should be analogized because they exhibit parallel legal and policy
foundations.
First, in Quirin, critics argue that President Roosevelt established military com-
missions after a formal congressional declaration of war.4 7 President Bush, con-
versely, established military commissions without a congressionally declared war.'48
Although this factual distinction is true, its potency should be taken in the context
of the time. In short, gone is the era of declared wars; for over fifty years, Congress
has declined to declare war formally despite the commitment of thousands of troops
and trillions of dollars in combating hostilities abroad.'49 Consider the language of
Congress's last declared war in comparison to the language of Joint Resolution 23,
authorizing presidential use of force in the wake of September 1 lth:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or
persons. 5°
Although the semantics between these statements are different, both the official dec-
laration and authorization of force approve markedly similar response-power by the
President, including swift military action. In sum, while Joint Resolution 23 should
not be conflated as denoting a modem day formal declaration of war, the overlapping
content and meaning' 5' between the two Congressional responses is enough to de-
tract from the critics' formalistic argument that Quirin is inapplicable without an
official declaration of war. 52
117 The U.S. declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and Germany and Italy on Decem-
ber 11, 1941. DECLARATIONS OF WAR 5 (Ernest V. Klun ed., 2002). President Roosevelt did
not make Proclamation 2561 and the subsequent Military Order until July 2, 1942. See ELSEA,
supra note 62, at CRS-46-CRS-47.
148 Evans, supra note 58, at 1844.
"49 The Vietnam and Korean Wars together cost an estimated 72 billion dollars. Preston
Quesenberry, Book Note, Bowling Together During War, 111 YALE L.J. 1031, 1034 n. 15
(2002).
110 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001).
'I" To further support that "meaning" overlaps between these two authorities, consider the
magnitude of the events that precipitated both responses. The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor resulted in the deaths of 2,400 Americans. The events of September 11 th resulted in
3,000 deaths. "When the death toll reaches the thousands the act enters a new realm,
comparable only to war." Geraghty, supra note 137, at 588. Importantly, however, the Quirin
tribunals were not in response to Pearl Harbor, but rather German infiltration of the east coast
which resulted in no casualties. If, as Quirin upheld, tribunals are appropriate for a declared
wartime incident where no deaths result, surely the spirit of its holding is applicable for an
undeclared wartime incident where thousands of deaths result. Id.
152 See, e.g., Bickers, supra note 77, at 917.
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To some, the applicability of Quirin in times without formal declared war sug-
gests it might be used as a platform for expansive executive action.'53 These critics
contend that Quirin could be used to legitimate unbridled executive power over for-
eign and domestic citizens in even the most peaceful times." 4 A careful analysis of
the historical use of military commissions proves this criticism is without empirical
support. In short, military commissions have only been used in times during, or im-
mediately following, declared hostilities and/or within declared combat zones. 5 In
exploring some of the most modem examples, Jordan Paust wrote:
The United States was clearly at war (however undeclared) in
Afghanistan after the insurgency between the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance was upgraded to an international armed con-
flict when the United States used military force in Afghanistan
on October 7 [2001]. The United States was also at war in the
Gulf region with respect to Iraq (i.e., regarding the continuing
international armed conflict in that region), and both interna-
tional armed conflicts triggered application of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and other customary laws of war, including various
due process guarantees for criminal accused. While "war" remains
in Afghanistan, the United States can set up a military commission
in Afghanistan (as a non-occupying power, with the consent of
the new Afghan regime) to try those reasonably accused of war
crimes, as it did with respect to the trial of General Yamashita for
war crimes during World War 11.56
As Paust alluded, "[a]lthough Congress did not formally declare war after the events
of September 11, 2001, they did authorize the use of military force.... [Tihe Joint
Resolution authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate force in response to
[terrorist] attacks."' 57
13 Tortuella, supra note 52, at 724-29.
i" Katyal & Tribe, supra note 75, at 1274 ("'[Nothing seems] more sinister and alarming
than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often
even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by
his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture."') (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
155 Lacey, supra note 59, at 47 ("Since before the birth of the United States, warriors have
used such tribunals to determine the guilt or innocence of their fellow warriors for law of war
violations, as courts of occupation or under martial law.").
156 Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 5-9 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
17 Melvin Heard et al., Military Commissions: A Legal andAppropriate Means of Trying
Suspected Terrorists, 49 NAVAL L. REv. 71, 76 (2002) (footnote omitted).
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Second, critics argue that in Quirin, enemy belligerents were acting on behalf
of a single enemy state and, conversely, the enemy belligerents subject to Bush's mili-
tary commissions represent a variety of nationalities, including nations allied with
the United States in the GWOT.'58 Although this, too, is true, it ignores the modem
reality of non-nation-state actors.'59 The language of Bush's Order reads, in part,
"Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess
both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks ... that,
if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths ... ."'60 This finding makes
clear that the "enemy" in the GWOT is an elusive, non-nation-state actor. To this end,
other critics of Bush's Order respond with more specific analysis: since "terrorism"
is not recognized as "international armed conflict" under the Geneva Convention, 61
Congress never intended the military tribunal process to apply to terrorists. 162 This
contention is unpersuasive for reasons involving both black-letter law and practical
policy.
Congress has consistently recognized the applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions to prisoners of war. 16 3 However, the non-Taliban al Qaeda individuals here are
detainees, not prisoners of war. 6" Bush made this categorization primarily because
al Qaeda is a foreign terrorist group, not a state party to the Geneva Convention.165
Further, the ability of the President to make such a categorization should not be con-
tested. As one scholar wrote, "[T]he determination that someone is an enemy of the
United States, and therefore subject to [the military commissions] forum for trying
15' Evans, supra note 58, at 1844-45.
159 See, e.g., Robert J. Bunker, Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organi-
zation, PARAMETERS, U.S. ARMY WAR COL. Q. Summer 1997, at 15.
160 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § 1(c).
6 Lt. Col. Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees,
Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws ofArmed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REv. 1, 37
(2004) ("AI-Qaeda is not a state, and has no comparable state authority or international legal
personality .... When individuals voluntarily join and support such an unlawful organi-
zation and then engage in international armed conflict, they are unlawful combatants and,
when captured, are outside the POW status rampart of Geneva Convention III.").
162 David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
427,430 (2003) ("Isolated attacks over a period of years by persons associated with freelance
terrorist networks unaffiliated with any government, however, generally have not been de-
fined as an armed conflict. Thus, the threshold requirement for application of the Geneva
Conventions... is not satisfied .... ).
163 Congress's most potent recognition of the Geneva Conventions is its ratification of
them. The United States ratified the Geneva Conventions on August 2, 1955. ICRC, States
Party to the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols (2005), http://www.icrc.
org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/party-gc/$File/Conventions%20de%2OGeneve%20et%
20Protocoles%20additionnels%20ENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) [hereinafter ICRC].
" White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo
(Feb. 7,2002), athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207- 13.html (last




their alleged criminality - is a political, not ajudicial, decision.' 1 In short, where
the courts have scrutinized the legitimacy of Presidentially created military com-
missions, they have done so through the lens of the President's political determina-
tions.1 67 To do otherwise would, itself, be a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
Third, in Quirin, President Roosevelt's established military commissions were not
in violation of the international norms and laws of the time.1 61 President Bush's com-
missions, according to critics, violate numerous international commitments including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 169 Although it is beyond the
scope of this Note to discuss international documents generally, they are salient to the
extent that President Bush would be in violation of current treaty requirements. 17
0
Fourth, critics lastly contend that Quirin should be inapplicable because justices
in the case purposefully drafted the decision to apply in a narrow context.' 7' As Carl
Tobias stated:
The Court intentionally resolved [Quirin] on the narrowest grounds,
stating as much expressly, and declined to treat many factual and
legal questions. For example, Stone neither thoroughly scrutinized
the claims against, and defenses proffered by, the saboteurs nor
the processes that tested them. This review derived, in essence,
from an agreement that rigorous scrutiny exceeded the Court's
capacity, given the time constraints. 1
72
However, the narrow context of the Quirin decision should not be enough to detract
from its precedential value. Indeed, several seminal provisions of the UCMJ were
codified in 1950, six years after the decision in the case. This persuasively suggests
that Congress intended for the Quirin decision to stand.
In conclusion, the judiciary has consistently recognized the President's ability
to create military tribunals in wartime. Though without the formal mantle of war,
the events of September 1 lth were catastrophic enough, in combination with Joint
Resolution 23, to constitute a time of "war" under which the Commander-in-Chief
could act. Because of these facts, the Supreme Court's seminal case of Quirin is
166 Anderson, supra note 5, at 634 (emphasis in original).
167 id.
168 The United States did not ratify the Third Geneva Convention until 1955, thirteen years
after the Quirin decision. ICRC, supra note 163.
169 Tobias, supra note 146, at 1401.
170 See, e.g., In re Austrian & German Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that "[gliven that separation of powers, the political-question doctrine restrains courts
from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been 'constitutional[ly] commit[ted]."') (internal
quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
17' Tobias, supra note 146, at 1396.
172 Id.
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applicable precedent. In Quirin, the Court ruled that President Roosevelt's Order
establishing tribunals was permissible action under the separation of powers doctrine.
For the many reasons that Quirin and the events of September 11 th are similar, "the
Court [should find] that the President's Detention Order was lawful under the AUMF
and consistent with his war powers under the Constitution.' 73
CONCLUSION
Chapter One of James Patterson's 1986 thriller Black Friday174 begins with an
eerily reminiscent scene: "He began to watch morning's earliest light fall on the
Wall Street scene.... Once he had it all vividly in sight, Colonel Hudson squeezed
his fingers tightly together. 'Boom,' he whispered quietly. The financial capital of
the world completely disappeared behind his clenched right fist. Boom.' ' 175 Fifteen
years after the debut of this book, part of the financial capital of the world was, in-
deed, destroyed by terrorist hands. The book and real life then converge on a singular
question: what could be done to avoid future horrors?
President Bush's answer was twofold, including increasing the nation's domestic
level of preparedness as well as mobilizing an international defensive effort. Over-
lapping both of these response levels was his November 13th Military Order, written
"[t]o protect the United States and its citizens."' 176 Almost immediately, critics moved
to denounce the Order as a violation of separation of powers; this use of executive
power should be quickly curtailed by Congress lest, they argued, the "'Bill of Rights
in America [be] distorted beyond recognition.' ,177 However, these critics failed to
recognize the mandate behind President Bush's action: as Commander-in-Chief,
Bush is charged to protect and defend the homeland from attack. Part of this defense
is the creation of military tribunals to differentiate those who pose current and future
threats to national interests from those who do not. This is not the retributive, penal
purpose associated with courts, but rather the protective, defensive purpose associated
with national security. In short, the President is - as Part I of this Note alludes -
acting pursuant to the powers historically afforded to the Commander-in-Chief.
Beyond this authorization from common law authority, the President's Order
was permissible under the separation of powers doctrine because of Congress's
explicit grant of statutory power; Joint Resolution 23 of September 8, 2001, and its
accompanying UCMJ Articles 21 and 36 provisions suffice as enabling authority
given the contemporary meaning of the statutes and what has been deemed adequate
in the past. Even if the Joint Resolution is deemed to add nothing, the President still
did not overstep his executive powers in enacting the Order.
Lastly, as Part V of this Note has attempted to articulate, constitutional ability
to create such tribunals has been crystallized in the state and federal courts, including
173 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (D.D.C. 2005).
174 JAMEs PATrERSON, BLACK FRIDAY (Warner Books 2000) (1986).
"' Id. at 1.
176 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2, § 1(e).
"' Bumiller & Myers, supra note 85.
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the Supreme Court itself. In Exparte Quirin, the Court deemed President Roosevelt's
Order a constitutionally permissible use of his Commander-in-Chief power. As Justice
Jackson, in agreeing with Justice Stone's majority opinion, privately wrote, "[There
exist] the soundest reasons why courts should refrain from reviewing in any way
orders of the President respecting prisoners of war."17
This trifold logic will be tested in United States v. Hamdan'79 in the months to
come. Already, the Supreme Court has given an indication of its willingness to devi-
ate from Quirin's peripheral conclusions. For example, in Quirin, "the Court deter-
mined that [claims of U.S. citizenship of one of the saboteurs] did 'not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the
law of war.""'  Conversely, in the summer 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,18' a plur-
ality of the Court held "that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification
as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker."'' 2 Does Hamdi symbolize a willingness by the Court to wholly
overrule Quirin in Hamdan? If so, not only would the legal foundation of Bush's Order
be seriously eroded, so too would be the groundwork which supports the Commander-
in-Chief s ability to respond to fluid, transborder threats of the new millennium.
178 Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson (Oct. 22, 1942), quoted in Belknap, supra note
66, at 79.
179 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
180 DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearings
Before the S. on the Comm. Judiciary, 107th Cong. 83 (2001) (statement of Scott L. Silliman,
Executive Director, Ctr. on Law, Ethics & Nat'l Security, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law) (citing Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942)), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.
cfm?id= 126&witid=70.
181 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
182 Id. at 533.
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